Alabama Law Journal

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 4

This is Part 4 of a four-part article on Alabama's speedy trial right. The text is one article, divided into four separate posts due to its length.

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 4
by William L. Pfeifer, Jr.

The Prejudice to the Defendant
The fourth and final factor to be weighed in a speedy trial analysis is any prejudice to a defendant that may have resulted from the delay. As stated previously, there are three primary interests to be protected by a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial: preventing excessive pretrial incarceration, limiting any impairment's on a defendant's liberty while out on bail, and reducing the chances that a defendant's ability to defend himself will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532. The Court considered the last of these to have the most serious potential for prejudice "because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 3

This is Part 3 of a four-part article on Alabama's speedy trial right. The text is one article, divided into four separate posts due to its length.

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 3
by William L. Pfeifer, Jr.

The Defendant's Assertion of the Right
The third factor to be weighed is a defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial. The Court in Barker v. Wingo held that a defendant does not waive the right to a speedy trial by failing to make a specific request for one. It is clearly established that a defendant has no duty to bring himself or herself to trial. Smith v. State, 409 So. 2d at 962. However, when a defendant does not affirmatively assert this right, the failure to do so is a factor that is weighed against him. Bailey v. State, 375 So. 2d 519 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Barker v. Wingo, the "failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove he was denied a speedy trial."

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 2

This is Part 2 of a four-part article on Alabama's speedy trial right. The text is one article, divided into four separate posts due to its length.

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama - Part 2
by William L. Pfeifer, Jr.

Reason for the Delay
If a presumption of prejudice has been established in the length of the delay, the second factor to be weighed is the reason for the delay. Not all presumptively prejudicial delays constitute a denial of the right to a speedy trial. However, the burden of justifying any delay rests with the State. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531. The reason for the delay is particularly important in this weighing process, as it involves an assignment of responsibility for the delay. For example, in Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court found that the defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial because the record demonstrated he did not want a speedy trial, and had in some ways at least passively contributed to the delay.

The Right to a Speedy Trial in Alabama

This is Part One of a four-part article.

THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL IN ALABAMA
by William L. Pfeifer, Jr.

Introduction.
A defendant's right to a speedy trial is intended to lessen any potential incarceration before a trial, to reduce any impairment of liberty if a defendant is out on bail, and to defuse any disruption in a defendant's attempt to defend himself in any criminal proceeding. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). In Alabama, a defendant's right to a speedy trial derives from both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Alabama Constitution. Although the United States Supreme Court affirmed the right to a speedy trial as a fundamental right imposed at the state level by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Court did not provide any real guidance on how to determine whether or not there had been a denial of the right to a speedy trial until the case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where it established a four-prong balancing test. The four factors to be balanced are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Any analysis of whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is based on this test.